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The Polluter-Pays Principle has been accepted by the majority of in-
dustrialized nations as the mechanism for controlling global pollution.'
This principle charges the polluter, not society as a whole, for abating the
cost of pollution prevention and control.2
Last spring, the Wall Street Journal published an article titled
GATT Report Says Trade Liberalization will Aid Global Environment
Protection.4 According to this report,6 further reduction of protectionist
measures in all likelihood will lead to "a substantial increase in global
environmental quality .. .even if no new environmental policies were
introduced."6
This paper examines the use of proposed GATT rules 7 as a means for
reducing global pollution to enhance overall environmental quality. In
other words, do the international rules for trade incorporate the Polluter-
Pays Principle to reduce environmental degradation? This article begins
by giving a general background of both the Polluter-Pays Principle and
GATT. A discussion of the role of the Polluter-Pays Principle in interna-
tional rules of trade follows. The article concludes with recommendations
for incorporating the Principle into GATT to achieve its claim that more
liberalized trade will lead to an overall increase in global environmental
quality.
* Assistant Professor, University of Houston - Downtown
1. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) adopted this
Principle for achieving sustainable development without environmental harm. For a discus-
sion of the OECD and the Polluter-Pays Principle, see part II-A of this paper. For an in-
depth discussion of how nations have adopted this principle, see Ursula Kettlewell, The
Answer to Global Pollution? A Critical Examination of the Problems and Potential of the
Polluter-Pays Principle, 3 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 429 (1992).
2. Gregory Wetstone & Armin Rosencranz, Transboundary Air Pollution: The Search
for an International Response, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 96 (1984).
3. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A12, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT]; see infra sec. II-B for a general discussion of GATT.
4. Bob Davis, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1992, at A2, col. 3.
5. This report, titled Trade and the Environment is a study conducted by the Secreta-
riat of the Geneva-based GATT, [hereinafter The Study]; see 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
310 (1992).
6. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
7. Currently the eighth round of trade negotiations called the Uruguay Round is taking
place to further liberalize the international rules of trade. See infra. part III-B for a discus-
sion of the proposed provisions.
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II. THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE AND GATT - BACKGROUND
A. The Polluter-Pays Principle
The Polluter-Pays Principle was initially devised by economists to
maximize resource allocation.' Since then, most industrial nations have
recognized the value of the Principle as a pollution abatement device.9 In
1972, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)'0 endorsed the use of the Polluter-Pays Principle to further its
goals." The OECD defined the Principle as follows:
The principle to be used for allocating costs of pollution prevention
and control measures to encourage rational use of scarce environmen-
tal resources and to avoid distortions in international trade and in-
vestment is the so-called "Polluter-Pays-Principle." This Principle
means that the polluter should bear the expenses of carrying out the
above mentioned measures decided by public authorities to ensure
that the environment is in an acceptable state.'2 In other words, the
cost of these measures should be reflected in the cost of goods and
services which cause pollution in production and or consumption.
Such measures should not be accomplished by subsidies that would
create significant distortions in international trade and investment.'
3
Therefore, the application of the Polluter-Pays Principle requires the in-
ternalization of all production costs including external costs, 4 "that is,
8. See STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EcONOMICS (Ingo Walter ed. 1976).
9. See Wetstone & Rosencranz, supra note 2, at 96.
10. The OECD was organized in 1960 to promote policies designed:
(1) to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a
rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial sta-
bility, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;
(2) to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-mem-
ber countries in the process of economic development; and
(3) to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-dis-
criminatory basis in accordance with international obligations.
The western industrialized nations, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and
Turkey are members of this organization and they produce the majority of
world trade. OECD, COMPENSATION FOR POLLUTION DAMAGE, inside front cover
(1981).
11. Id.
12. Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, OECD Doc. ENV (73)
32 (Final) of January 21, 1974, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 238, 239 (1975) [hereinafter Note on
the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle]. The OECD defines an acceptable state
as that state decided by the public authorities which "implies that through a collective
choice and with respect to the limited information available, the advantage of a further
reduction in the residual social damage involved is considered as being smaller than the
social cost of further prevention and control." In other words, the "acceptable state" is de-
fined by a government as the level of pollution tolerated as acceptable.
13. OECD, Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Envi-
ronmental Policies, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1172 (1972) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Guid-
ing Principles].
14. Jean Philippe Barde, National and International Policy alternatives for Environ-
mental Control and Their Economic Implications, in Studies In International Environmen-
VOL. 21:1
GATT
damage caused by pollution."' 5
However, the OECD recognized that in order for the Principle to
work, it must be uniformly applied by all nations. This, in the opinion of
the OECD, can only be accomplished "through the adoption of a common
basis for Member countries' environmental policies."' 6 But, recognizing
that such harmonization of policies and standards does not exist, the
OECD encouraged its members to strive toward this goal in order "to
avoid the unjustified disruption of international trade patterns and of the
international allocation of resources which may arise from diversity of na-
tional environmental standards.' 7
The OECD recommended the implementation of the Polluter-Pays
Principle through a variety of means such as direct or indirect regulation,
taxes, permits, product and process standards, and pollution charges.' 8
The OECD also recommended the use of economic instruments to add
"more flexibility, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the design and en-
forcement of pollution control measures' 9 to aid in a more consistent
application of the Polluter-Pays Principle.
2 0
In summary, the Polluter-Pays Principle as been advanced as the
means to abate and control pollution. In other words, if polluters bear the
cost of pollution prevention and control, market failure and distortions of
trade will be avoided, while at the same time national environmental
goals will be realized. 2'
tal Economics 138 (Ingo Walter ed. 1976). External costs, or externalities, refer to costs
associated with the use of a resource that is not reflected in the product price. For example,
discharging production waste into a river is an external cost because clean-up of the pollu-
tion in the river caused by the waste is not borne by the producer but by future users. This
constitutes improper cost allocation which will result in overproduction resulting in a misal-
location of resources and - in the opinion of many economists - ultimately will lead to "mar-
ket failure." See ORRIS C. HERFINDAHL & ALLEN V. KNEESE, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT;
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO SOME PROBLEMS IN USING LAND, WATER, AND AIR 7 (1965). It is
the opinion of these economists that if such "market failure" is not corrected, it will lead to
all types of pollution.
15. Pollution is defined by economists as a misallocation of resources due to improper
product pricing. See Kenneth R. Reed, Economic Incentives for Pollution Abatement: Ap-
plying Theory to Practice, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 513-14 (1970).
16. Recommendation on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays-Principle, OECD
Doc. C (74) 223 (1974), reprinted in INT'L PROTECTION ENV'T 313 (1975).
17. Guiding Principles, supra note 13, at 1173.
18. Note on the Implementation of the Polluter-Pays Principle, supra note 12, at 239.
19. OECD Council Regulation on the Use of Economic Instruments in Environmental
Policy, adopted Jan. 31, 1991, reprinted in 14(2) INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) No. 5, sec. 2, at
23 (1991).
20. Id. Examples.of such economic instruments are, amongst others, emission charges
or taxes, marketable permits, deposit-refund systems, and some forms of financial assistance
consistent with the Principle.
21. See Kettlewell, supra note 1, for an in-depth analysis of the Polluter-Pays Principle
and problems associated with its implementation.
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B. GATT
1. Creation of GATT
Unlike the Polluter-Pays Principle, the international rules of trade
were not developed to maximize resource allocation and avoid distortions
in trade. Instead, these rules were advanced to maximize the free flow of
trade in order to increase the general economic standard of living of the
global community.
In 1946, the leaders of the world community determined an interna-
tional trade organization was needed to oversee international trade and
prevent the reoccurrence of conditions,2 which, in their opinion, were
partially responsible for the Second World War.2" The Economic and So-
cial Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations met to draft a charter for
an international trade organization (ITO).2 4 This charter consisted of
three parts, the first dealing with the ITO, and the other two parts with
the multilateral trade agreements for tariff reductions. However, the U.S.
Congress failed to approve the Charter, and as a result the ITO never
came into existence.2" The multilateral trade agreements (part 2 and 3 of
the Charter), on the other hand, were adopted under separate trade au-
thority26 and became known as GATT.2 7
The goals and objectives of these agreements were enunciated in its
Preamble:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic en-
deavor should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living,
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the re-
sources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of
goods, . . ."
In order to accomplish these goals of economic prosperity and growth, the
22. John H. Jackson, GATT and the Future of International Trade Institutions, 18
BROOKLYN J. OF INT'L L. 11, 16 (1992).
23. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 31 (1990)[hereinafter THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]. Protectionist
measures such as quota-type restrictions adopted by the United States and other industrial-
ized nations prevented the free flow of international trade.
24. 1 UN ESCOR Res. 13, U.N. DOC. E/22 (1946).
25. THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 23, at 34.
26. The President of the United States was delegated statutory authority to negotiate
multilateral tariff reduction agreements. An Act to Extend the Authority of the President
Under sec. 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and for Other Purposes, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 59
Stat. 410, (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. secs. 1351-1366 (1945).
27. GATT, supra note 3. Twenty-four nations initially signed these agreements in 1947.
GATT was adopted in the U.S. through the Protocol of Provisional Application PPA. See
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 23, at 35.
28. GATT, supra note 3, Preamble, 55 U.N.T.S. at 194. reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 21 (John H. Barton & Bart S. Fisher eds.
1986) [hereinafter TRADE AND INVESTMENT].
VOL. 21:1
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parties agreed to enter into "reciprocal and mutually advantageous ar-
rangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other bar-
riers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in inter-
national commerce. 2 0 These arrangements became by far the most
important multilateral agreements governing international trade.3"
2. Organization of GATT
GATT is not considered a self-executing treaty,3" and all multilateral
decisions are made by the CONTRACTING PARTIES3 2 in accordance with the
provisions of Article XXV. However, even though GATT was conceived
as an agreement, not an organization, over the years it has taken on the
characteristics of both.3
The CONTRACTING PARTIES are still the source of the primary deci-
sions made by GATT. Each contracting party is a member of the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES which meet once a year. Decisions are normally made
by consensus, even though each contracting party has one vote. 4 How-
ever, since 1960 the majority of the work of the Contracting Parties has
been carried out by the GATT Council. 5 It meets monthly and oversees
all the work of the various GATT working parties, committees and
panels.
3. GATT Rules which Govern Trade
The work which is carried out by these various groups is governed by
the rules contained in the original agreements on tariffs and trade, and
subsequent rounds of trade negotiations.3 " These rules are based on two
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solutions, 21
ENVTL. L. REP. (BNA) 10599 (Oct. 1991).
31. Georg M. Berrisch, The Establishment of New Law Through Subsequent Practice
in GATT, 16 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 497, 500 (1991). However, the author states that
two recent judgments from the Court of Justice of the European Community, which first
declared GATT not to be a treaty, indicated a change in its position.
32. CONTRACTING PARTIES refers to actions taken by the contracting parties jointly and
not by a governing body like the ITO which was never created. See GATT, supra note 3,
art. XXV. 55 U.N.T.S. at 272.
33. Youri Devuyst, GATT Customs Union Provisions and the Uruguay Round: The
European Community Experience, 26 J. WORLD TRADE 15, 16 (Feb. 1992).
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. Council membership consists of those contracting parties who wish to partici-
pate. The Council was created in the 16th Session of GATT (1960) GATT Doc. SR. 16/11,
at 160 (1960).
36. Seven negotiating rounds have been successfully completed, with the eighth round
currently in progress. See Jackson, supra note 22, at 11. Each round generally lasts four
years, except for the last two rounds which have taken longer. The Tokyo Round lasted five
years, and the Uruguay Round has been in progress since 1986. See Judith H. Bello & Alan
F. Holmer, Recent Developments -U.S. Trade Law and Policy Series No. 19: The Uruguay
Round: Where Are We? 25 INr'L LAW. 723, 724 (1991). GATT is primarily used as a forum
for trade negotiations. Over 100 nations are now members and over 200 separate multilat-
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primary principles, (1) non-discrimination (MFN)3 7 and (2) trade barrier
reductions,3 8 to further the goals and objectives of GATT. Therefore, by
extending like treatment to like products of trading partners and prohib-
iting import surcharges for the protection of domestic industry, 9 trade is
liberalized to the extent of negotiated tariffs.
In addition to these tariff concessions, GATT also tries to eliminate
or reduce non-tariff barriers, such as quantitative restrictions, 0 subsi-
dies,"' and dumping of domestic goods on foreign markets,42 in order to
promote fair trade. The Tokyo Round was most successful in accomplish-
ing some of these reductions."'
However, GATT grants a number of exemptions from its provisions
to permit a contracting party to protect superior national interests. 4
GATT also provides a waiver procedure where any contracting party can
be excused from a GATT obligation if two-thirds of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES approve. 45 The question is whether the provisions as a whole or
the exemptions advance the goal of the Polluter-Pays Principle - to re-
duce global pollution?
III. THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE AND GATT - INTERPRETATION
Environmental protection was not an issue when GATT came into
eral agreements make up the GATT legal system. See Hauser, Proposal for a Multilateral
Agreement on Free Market Access (Mafma), 25 J. WORLD TRADE 76, 79 (Oct. 1991).
37. GATT, supra note 3, art. I, 55 U.N.T.S. at 196. General Most-Favoured-nation
Treatment (MFN). This provision requires non-discriminatory treatment of all GATT con-
tracting parties regarding the importation and exportation of all goods and transfer of pay-
ments. For example, this would prohibit one nation from giving preferential treatment to
one or more of its GATT trading partners without extending that same treatment to all
other GATT members.
38. GATT, supra note 3, art. II, § 4, 55 U.N.T.S. at 200. This article extends domestic
protection of domestic products to imported foreign goods through negotiated tariffs. It re-
quires that "[no contracting party shall alter its method of determining dutiable value or of
converting currencies so as to impair the value of any of the concessions provided for in the
appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement."
39. Jackson, supra note 22, at 40.
40. GATT, supra note 3, art. XI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224.
41. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250.
42. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
43. The Tokyo Round was opened in September, 1973 at a meeting of the Ministers in
Tokyo. The meeting was open to GATT members and non-GATT members. 102-countries
participated in the negotiations. The Tokyo Round lasted more than five years with many
delays resulting from economic uncertainty, political conditions, and legislative processes.
The Round was opened for signature on April 12, 1979. See TRADE AND INVESTMENT, supra
note 28, at 152. During this round not only traditional tariff reductions were negotiated, but
codes "on the use of subsidies and countervailing measures, antidumping standards, and
government procurement" were adopted. See Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 724.
44. GATT, supra note 3, 55 U.N.T.S. art. XII at 228, art. XVIII-B, at 252. Article XII
and XVIII-B provide for economic exceptions to safeguard its balance of payments; Article
XIX permits a protection against import surges; Article XX permits a nation to uphold its
public policies; and Article XXI permits an exception for essential security interests.
45. GATT, supra note 3, art. XXV, 55 U.N.T.S. at 272.
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being. Rules for trade liberalization were drafted without considering
their environmental effects. It was not until the early seventies that the
global community became interested in environmental issues. The Decla-
ration on the Human Environment" was adopted at the U.N. Conference
on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972. It enun-
ciated the principle of state responsibility 7 and liability' s for extraterrito-
rial environmental harm.
These principles were interpreted by the OECD to mean that each
State has a general obligation of diligence to protect the environment.' 9
Therefore:
A State must constantly have available adequate legal and physical
means for ensuring normal compliance with its international obliga-
tions [and] . .. it must equip itself, notably where protection of the
environment is concerned, with the laws and administrative regula-
tions, in both the civil and criminal fields, necessary to achieve this
end. 0
Since the Declaration on the Human Environment, many nations, in-
cluding the U.S., have adopted a variety of environmental regulations to
carry out the mandate of the Declaration."' Environmental awareness
continues to grow, and with such serious threats as global warming and
ozone depletion constantly in the public eye, it is no longer possible to
negotiate liberalized trade agreements without considering their environ-
mental effects.
A. Interpretation and Implementation of GATT Rules
Over the past 45 years many trade disputes have been negotiated.
However, only recently have they involved environmental claims. These
disputes generally involve Article XX exemptions which permit nations
to pursue their own domestic policies relating to safety, health, and the
46. Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, at 7, U.N. Doc.A/Conf. 48/14
(1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). This Declaration was the product of the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment which convened in Stockholm, Sweden in June,
1972.
47. Id. at 1420, Principle 21.
48. Id. Principle 22.
49. Observations on the Concept of the International Responsibility of States in Rela-
tion to the Protection of the Environment, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION
380, 382 (1977) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS]. For an in-depth discussion of state responsibil-
ity for environmental harm, see Kettlewell, supra note 1, at 437-445.
50. LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 49, at 384.
51. For example, some of the environmental laws passed by the United States are:
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C § 7401 (1970), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 7612, Pub. L. No. 101-549
(1990); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1972); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C § 2601 (1976); and Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601
(1980).
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conservation of exhaustible natural resources.2 The outcome of two of
these disputes indicates that GATT not only fails to accept the Principle,
but also prevents its application if the result would restrict trade.
1. The Superfund Excise Tax Dispute
In 1988, GATT was given an opportunity to determine whether it
recognized the Polluter-Pays Principle in its interpretation of interna-
tional rules of trade. The dispute involved two excise taxes imposed by
the United States. 3 The first involved an 11.7 cents per barrel petroleum
tax on foreign oil, as opposed to the 8.2 cents domestic tax. The panel
had no difficulty in finding that this differential violated the national
treatment provision of Article 111(2) and the United States was asked to
reduce that tax. 4 The other excise tax imposed a tax on certain "down-
stream chemicals equivalent to the tax they would have borne had their
inputs been sold in the United States. ' 55 In this case, the panel had a
much more difficult time reaching its conclusion.
The EC and Canada objected to the tax arguing that the pollution
created in the production of these chemicals occurred in the producing
country, not the U.S. Therefore, they should not be taxed upon entry into
the U.S. They also argued that chemicals produced in the U.S., but ex-
ported, should not be exempt from the tax, since the pollution occurred
in the U.S. The EC pointed out that these, "tax adjustments departed
from the principles adopted by the OECD Council in 1972... In particu-
lar from the Polluter-Pays Principle which meant that the polluter should
bear the costs of measures decided by public authorities to ensure that
the environment was in an acceptable state."5 "
The EC further argued that the border adjustment was not necessary
52. GATT, supra note 3, art. XX (b) & (g), 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Article XX more specif-
ically states that:
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or en-
forcement by any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health; . . . (g) relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunc-
tion with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
53. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
United States Superfund Excise Taxes [adopted June 17, 1987], B.I.S.D., 34th Supp. (Ge-
neva: GATT, June 1988), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1596 (1988) [hereinafter Superfund Tax].
Disputes are normally resolved through panels. For an in depth discussion of GATT dispute
settlement procedures see Abbott, GATT as a Public Institution: The Uruguay Round and
Beyond, 18 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 32, 52-65 (1992), and Horlick, The US-Canada FTA and
GATT Disputes Settlement Procedures, 26 J. OF WORLD TRADE 5 (1992).
54. Superfund Tax, supra note 53, at 1597. This provision states in part that "[tihe
products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other
contracting party shall not be subject directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other inter-
nal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic
products."
55. Id. at 1596.
56. Id. at 1607 (emphasis added).
VOL. 21:1
to offset any unfair advantage of the foreign producer, because, in accor-
dance with the Polluter-Pays Principle, the producer probably would
have paid pollution charges or taxes in the producing country. 57 There-
fore, the border adjustment actually places the foreign producer at a dis-
advantage because the producer must pay pollution charges twice. The
EC charged that "[wihat the United States was in fact doing under the
label of border tax adjustments was to ask foreign producers to help de-
fray the costs of cleaning up the environment for the United States
industries. ' '6
8
The United States, on the other hand, argued "that the Polluter-
Pays Principle had not been adopted by the Contracting Parties and it
was on the GATT provisions and not on OECD recommendations that
the Panel had to base its conclusion. ' '5 9 The United States, however,
noted that "[ejnvironmental policy principles related to trade could con-
ceivably be incorporated into the GATT legal system, but such a far-
reaching step required the cooperation of all contracting parties and
could be taken only after considerable study and discussion. '"60
The Panel, after considering all the arguments, recognized that
GATT disputes must be resolved "in light of relevant GATT provi-
sions,' 61 and held that GATT had not adopted the Polluter-Pays Princi-
ple. The panel did not examine the consistency of the revenue provisions
in the Superfund Act with the environmental objectives of that Act or
with the Polluter-Pays Principle. Instead, it found "that the tax on cer-
tain chemicals, being a tax directly imposed on products, was eligible for
border tax adjustment independent of the purpose it served."6' 2
2. The Tuna Import Restrictions Dispute6 1
More recently, another GATT panel was given the opportunity to ex-
amine the effect of environmental regulations on trade. The United
States imposed an embargo on the importation of Mexican tuna because
it was harvested with the purse-seine method in the Eastern Tropical Pa-
cific Ocean (ETP) in violation of the United States Marine Mammal Pro-





61. Id. at 1614.
62. Id.
63. GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Mexican Tuna Panel]. As of this date, the
panel report has not been adopted by the Council. Mexico and the United States are in the
process of working out the disagreement.
64. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (1972), as amended, notably by Pub. L. No. 100-
711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988) and most recently by Pub. L. No. 101-627, 104 Stat. 4467 (1990)
codified in part at 16 U.S.C. 1361(f). The Act contains some specific requirements regarding
the taking of other marine mammals while harvesting yellowfin tuna in a specific region of
GATT1992
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with the United States failed, asked for the establishment of a GATT
panel to hear the dispute. A panel was established and approximately
twenty other nations reserved the right to be heard.65
Both parties and the intervenors presented extensive arguments.
Mexico primarily argued that the embargo violated Article XIII, quanti-
tative restrictions, and that none of the measures taken by the United
States were in compliance with GATT provisions. It asked that the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES recommend the United States bring its statutory re-
quirements under the MMPA "into conformity with its obligations under
the General Agreement.6
The United States, on the other hand, asked the Panel to make the
following findings:
(a) The measures imposed under the MMPA with respect to certain
domestic yellowfin tuna from Mexico were internal regulations affect-
ing the sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or
use of tuna and tuna products consistent with Article 111:4; and
(b) even if these measures are not consistent with Article III, they
were covered by the exceptions in Article XX(b) and XX(g); 7
and to reject Mexico's claim."
The Panel analyzed at length the exceptions under Article XX (b)
and (g) and noted:
"that Mexico had argued that the measures prohibiting imports of
certain yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna products from Mexico im-
posed by the United States were quantitative restrictions on importa-
tion under Article XI, while the United States had argued that these
measures were internal regulations enforced at the time or point of
importation under Article 111:4 and the Note Ad Article III, namely
that the prohibition of imports of tuna and tuna products from Mex-
ico constituted an enforcement of the regulations of the MMPA relat-
ing to the harvesting of domestic tuna."6
The Panel examined Article 111:4, concluding that it "refers solely to
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, etc. of
products... that are of the same nature as those applied to the domestic
the Pacific Ocean called the ETP. They discovered that in that particular area, yellowfin
tuna will always be in the same area with dolphins. As a result, if the purse-seine nets are
used for harvesting tuna, dolphins will also be killed. To conserve dolphins, the MMPA sets
standards for the taking of yellowfin tuna and dolphins, and permits an embargo on im-
ported tuna taken in violation of these standards.
65. The nations that wanted to be heard were Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, the European Communities, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Nica-
ragua, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Singapore, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia and
Venezuela. See Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 63, at 1598.
66. Id. at 1601.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1617.
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products. '"7 The Panel then noted that the MMPA applies to the har-
vesting of tuna in order to avoid the killing of dolphins, and as such does
not directly regulate the tuna as a product. Therefore, the Panel con-
cluded that the -provisions of the MMPA relating to the harvesting of
tuna are not covered by the Note Ad Article III, and thus violate GATT.
The Panel then examined the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions. First
it found the measures under the MMPA did not meet the test of "neces-
sary" under Article XX(b), and that the measures taken under Article
XX(g) cannot be applied extraterritorially. 71
In its concluding comments, the Panel noted that GATT places few
restrictions on the enforcement of domestic environmental regulations as
long as they do not discriminate against like imported products. But, "a
contracting party may not restrict imports of a product merely because it
originates in a country with environmental policies different from its
own." 72 The panel noted that if such exceptions should be allowed under
Article XX(b) and (g), GATT should be amended or a waiver should be
granted. It recommended that "the CONTRACTING PARTIES request the
United States to bring the above measure into conformity with its obliga-
tions under the General Agreement. '73
In summary, these two panel decisions show that GATT interpreta-
tions, so far, do not consider the Polluter-Pays Principle in their analysis
and outcome. The Superfund Tax panel clearly acknowledged that the
Polluter-Pays Principle has not been adopted by GATT. The Mexican
Tuna panel decision, however, implies that even if the Principle were rec-
ognized, it could not be applied if it resulted in restrictions on interna-
tional trade. In other words, the United States cannot prohibit the impor-
tation of products which have been produced without the benefit of
environmental regulation nor can it add a surcharge on such goods to
equalize production costs, 74 a prerequisite for a successful application of
the Polluter-Pays Principle.
B. The Uruguay Round and the Polluter-Pays Principle
These panel decisions reflect GATT rules currently in force. How-
ever, since the Mexican Tuna decision became public, much discussion
has taken place regarding the interaction of environmental issues and
trade. The attention is now focused on the Uruguay Round which is in its
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1620-21.
72. Id. at 1622. As one author noted, the difference between product and production
can by "analyzed as a conflict-of-laws rule intended to allocate jurisdiction between the
United States and Mexico. Mexico is accorded exclusive jurisdiction over domestic produc-
tion processes, while the United States is accorded jurisdiction over products physically
brought to the United States." See Trachtman, GATT Dispute Settlement Panel, 86 AM. J.
INT'L L. 142, 150-51 (1992).
73. Mexican Tuna Panel, supra note 63, at 1623.
74. See discussion infra parts III-B(3) and IV.
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last stretch of negotiations. This Round started in 1986," with a pro-
jected completion date of 1990. However, due to major differences in agri-
cultural reforms in the areas of export subsidies, internal supports, and
market access, the negotiations have stalled numerous times and have yet
to be completed."'
On December 20, 1991, GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel re-
leased, with the intent to move negotiations along, a very lengthy docu-
ment called the Uruguay Round Final Act." The text was originally la-
beled "take it or leave it," with an opportunity for comments by member
negotiating nations.7 However, since the release of this document, much
criticism has been launched against many of its provisions. For example,
a key U.S. labor advisory committee urged the United States to reject the
draft because, in the committee's opinion, it would lead to higher unem-
ployment, "undermine U.S. environmental regulations, limit the ability of
U.S. lawmakers to promote economic growth, and place U.S. industry and
workers at a competitive disadvantage." '79 Environmentalists, in particu-
lar, are concerned if the provisions are adopted "as is," since environmen-
tal laws will have to be rewritten to meet the lowest common
denominator. s
1. Environmentalist's Look at Final Act Provisions
The environmental implications of various provisions in the Final
Act have been analyzed by various groups. One such analysis was pre-
pared by Lori Wallach, an environmental attorney for a health, consumer,
and environmental advocate group called Public Citizen in Washington
D.C."' She argues that two major sections of the Final Act - Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards (SPS)8 2 and Technical Barriers to Trade
75. Bello & Holmer, supra note 36, at 724-25. One of the main U.S. objectives for this
Round was to include services under the GATT umbrella. Two negotiating groups were
formed. One was charged with negotiating an agreement on services to be included in
GATT, since at the present time GATT provisions only cover goods. The second group
handled the more traditional negotiating topics such as agricultural subsidies, tariff reduc-
tions, and the dispute settlement process.
76. Id. at 726.
77. The Dunkel document is G.A.T.T. Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA, (Dec. 20, 1991) [herein-
after Final Act].
78. Uruguay Round Talks to Last Until Spring as U.S., EC Voice Reservations on
Draft, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No.3 at 98 (Jan. 15, 1992). 108 nations are participating in
these negotiations, and they were to report their comments by January 13, 1992.
79. Key Labor Advisory Group Urges U.S. to Reject Dunkel's Draft GATT Agreement,
9 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 5 at 191 (Jan. 29, 1992). These comments were made in a
letter to U.S. Trade Representative Carla A. Hills.
80. Wallach, Analysis of the "Final Act", PUBLIC CITIZEN (Dec. 26, 1991).
81. Id. This group was started by consumer advocate, Ralph Nader.
82. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 45, Annex A, 1. These standards are defined as any
measure applied:
- to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the con-
tracting party from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of
pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms:
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(TBT),8S will have a negative effect on our environmental, health and
consumer regulations because these provisions "promote downwards har-
monization and mandate affirmative preemption." ' I
More specifically, the SPS measures fall under GATT Article XX ex-
ceptions which can only be applied to safeguard human, animal, and
plant life from specific risks within the territory of the contracting
party.8 5 The measures include "laws, regulations, requirements and proce-
dures" including "end product criteria, processing and production meth-
ods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures ... statisti-
cal methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and
packaging and labelling requirements directly related to food safety."88
These measures cannot be more restrictive than the international
standards accepted by GATT8 7 , which, in the opinion of some environ-
mentalists, promotes "harmonization downward of national standards
that are higher than international standards."'  As pointed out by Ms.
- to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the con-
tracting party from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or dis-
ease-causing organisms, in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
- to protect human life or health within the territory of the contracting party
from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof
or from the entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
- to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the contracting party
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests.
Id. (emphasis added).
83. Final Act, supra note 77 at G. 20, Annex 1, 1. A technical regulation is defined as
a "document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes and produc-
tion methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, with which compliance is
mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging,
marking or labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method."
A technical standard is defined as a
document approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and re-
peated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes
and production methods, with which compliance is not mandatory. It may also
include or deal exclusively with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or
labelling requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.
Id. pars. 2 (emphasis added).
"For the purpose of this Agreement standards are defined as voluntary and technical
regulations as mandatory documents." Id. para. 2, Explanatory Note.
84. Wallach, supra note 80, at 2.
85. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 36, V 1 and L. 45, Annex A, 1. See Final Act, supra
note 82 for the definition of SPS which cites examples of specific risks.
86. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 45, Annex A, 1 1.
87. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 46, Annex 1, 3. The standards for food safety are
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission; standards for animal health and zoo-
noses are developed by the International Office of Epizootics; standards for plant health are
developed by the International Plant Protection Convention in co-operation with regional
organizations; and for other areas standards developed by other relevant international
organizations.
88. Wallach, supra note 80, at 14-15.
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Wallach, many United States standards relating to food, pesticides, addi-
tives, and contaminants are more restrictive than these international
standards. Therefore, these restrictive standards would constitute an un-
fair trade barrier under the Final Act."
Furthermore, SPS measures are to be applied "only to the extent
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, are based on
scientific principles and are not maintained against available scientific ev-
idence." 90 This provision shifts the burden of proof to the contracting
party with the more restrictive law to justify its standard, rather than
placing the burden upon the contracting party challenging that law.
Technical standards must also comply with GATT acceptable inter-
national standards, 91 unless they fit a very narrow exception.92 These in-
ternational standards "shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an un-
necessary obstacle to international trade." ' If there are no international
standards, then "technical regulations shall not be more trade restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks
non-fulfillment would create." ' But most important, "technical regula-
tions shall not be maintained if the circumstances or objectives giving rise
to their adoption no longer exist or if the changed circumstances or objec-
tives can be addressed in a less trade-restrictive manner."95
Therefore, if a nation's existing laws are stricter than acceptable
GATT standards, the Final Act mandates regulatory compliance. If a
89. Id. at 12-14.
90. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 36, 1 6.
91. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2, % 2.4. The provision specifically states that
"where technical regulations are required and relevant international standards exist or their
completion is imminent, Parties shall use them, or the relevant parts of them, as a basis for
their technical regulations .... (emphasis added).
92. Id. It states as follows: "except when such international standards or relevant parts
would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objec-
tives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical factors or funda-
mental technological problems."
93. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2 1 2.5.
94. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2, T 2.2. Legitimate objectives are defined in
this paragraph as: "national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices;
protection of human health and safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment. In
assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, inter alia, available scientific
and technical information, related processing technology or intended end uses of products."
95. Final Act, supra note 77, at G. 3, art. 2, T 2.3. (emphasis added).
96. Final Act, supra note 77, at L. 43, V 45. This provision states in pertinent part:
Contracting parties shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to
them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories, as well
as regional bodies in which relevant entities within their territories are mem-
bers, comply with the relevant provisions of this decision .... Contracting par-
ties shall ensure that they rely on the services of non-governmental entities for
implementing sanitary or phytosanitary measures only if these entities comply
with the provisions of this decision.
Id.
Final Act, G.5, art. 3, 1 3.5 contains the same provision regarding technical regulations.
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nation were to refuse and its standards were to be challenged, a GATT
panel could declare the national law incorporating those standards "to be
an unnecessary obstacle to trade."97
In summary, the provisions of the Final Act have carved out very
narrow exceptions for Article XX. If an environmental law is more re-
strictive than the GATT accepted international standard, it will be ex-
tremely difficult for a nation to meet the requirements of "the extent nec-
essary to protect . . ." and "against available scientific evidence." As a
result, the nation must either harmonize "downward" its environmental
regulations or be in violation of GATT.
2. GATT's Look at Environment and Trade
GATT, in an attempt to address some of these concerns, published a
study98 conducted by the secretariat dealing with the interaction of trade
and the environment. The Study does not directly address the proposed
provisions in the Final Act, but instead deals with policy issues in gen-
eral. The Study points out that GATT provisions do not prevent nations
from pursuing their own environmental policies, since GATT provides ex-
emptions from its obligations if the international standards "are inappro-
priate for the Parties concerned, for inter alia such reasons as ... protec-
tion for human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the
environment; fundamental climatic or other geographical factors . . .99
But, these exemptions, as pointed out in The Study, are narrowly
construed in order to prevent contracting parties from imposing "unwar-
ranted, trade-inhibiting restrictions.' '100 It argues strongly against the use
of "trade policies to influence environmental measures in other coun-
tries."' 0 ' As noted in The Study,
[w]hen the environmental problem is due to production or consump-
tion activities in another country, the GATT rules are more of a con-
straint, since they prohibit making market access dependent on
changes in the domestic policies or practices of the exporting country.
The rational for this is that to do otherwise would invite a flood of
import restrictions as countries (especially those with large markets)
either attempted to impose their own domestic environmental, eco-
"Parties are fully responsible under this Agreement for the observance of all provisions of
Article 2. Parties shall formulate and implement positive measures and mechanisms in sup-
port of the observance of the provisions of Article 2 by other than central government bod-
ies." Id.
97. Wallach, supra note 80, at 22.
98. This report, titled Trade and the Environment is a study conducted by the secre-
tariat of the GATT. 9 INT'L TRADE REP. No. 8 at (BNA) 310 (1992) [hereinafter The Study].
This study was released after the Final Act was presented to the negotiating countries. But
even though there are no direct references to sections within the Final Act, one can only
assume that the arguments were made keeping in mind the provisions of the Act.
99. Id. at 8. Article XX(b) and (g) are considered the environmental exceptions.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 1.
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nomic and social policies on other countries, or used such an attempt
as a pretext for reducing competition from imports.10
The Study recognizes that different environmental standards have
industry concerned about its competitiveness. The fear is that lower stan-
dards abroad will lead to "ecological dumping.""1 ' According to The
Study, if countries engage in unilateral actions to "offset the competitive-
ness effects of different environmental standards, or . . . [to] attempt to
force other countries to adopt domestically-favoured practices and poli-
cies, the trading system would start down a very slippery slope."104
Instead of imposing unilateral trade restrictions to enforce environ-
mental policies,'10 5 The Study urges multilateral environmental agree-
ments to resolve environmental policy issues. Should such agreements be
impossible, then the parties should seek an amendment to GATT or ob-
tain a GATT waiver. 10 6 After all, the purpose of GATT is to prevent dis-
crimination between domestic and foreign products in order to facilitate
trade, not to build protectionist walls to keep out trade.
Only in passing does The Study mention how liberalized trade will
improve overall environmental quality. The argument is made that a re-
duction in agricultural subsidies will shift agricultural production to less
developed nations which are inclined to use less chemical fertilizers and
pesticides. Based on this assumption, The Study concludes that:
Liberalizing protectionist agricultural policies in the high income
countries is therefore likely to (i) cause the world's food to be pro-
duced with fewer chemicals, which in turn would reduce chemical resi-
dues in food in the natural environment; and (ii) have at most a very
modest impact on the rate of deforestation. It would also increase the
availability of land for recreational and aesthetic uses - including the
replanting of forests - in several high income countries as marginal
farm land was taken out of production. Thus, in all likelihood there
would be a substantial increase in global environmental quality fol-
lowing agricultural trade liberalization, even if no new environmental
102. Id. at 5.
103. Ecological dumping occurs when goods are produced without the benefit of suffi-
cient environmental controls. The producer will be able to externalize some of his produc-
tion costs which results in cheaper goods. These goods, if exported to a more environmen-
tally restrictive environment, will be considered "dumped." For a more complete
explanation, see infra part IV.
104. The Study, supra note 98, at 5. However, the article does not explain what is
meant by "a very slippery slope."
105. The Mexican Tuna decision is an example. The MMPA contains a United States
environmental policy on harvesting tuna in the ETP region, and to make sure that other
nations comply with the U.S. policy, the Act permits an embargo against imported tuna
harvested contrary to the method permitted by statute. Mexico's tuna harvesting methods
did not comply, therefore the embargo was imposed.
106. In order to get a GATT waiver, the party needs the support of two-thirds of
GATT's membership - or, at the present time, 69 nations out of 103. The Study makes the
point that if an issue has wide support, then it should not be difficult to get a waiver. Id. at
6.
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policies were introduced .... 01
In summary, The Study supports the Mexican Tuna panel report by
denouncing unilateral actions to enforce environmental policies and goals.
It concludes by stating, "non-discriminatory domestic policies offer the
most efficient approach to dealing with nearly all environmental
problems. Interference with trade is seldom, if ever, the first-best way of
achieving a particular domestic environmental objective."' 0 8
C. The Conflict between GATT and the Polluter-Pays Principle
A successful application of the Polluter-Pays Principle relies in part
on harmonized environmental policies and standards. If harmonization is
lacking, then the imbalance created by one nation permitting externali-
ties in the production process can be offset by a countervailing duty.10 9
This practice would serve a dual purpose, (1) eliminate the competitive
advantage gained by the producer, and (2) encourage greater environmen-
tal harmonization.
This practice is, however, in direct conflict with GATT provisions. In
The Study, the author lists three ways in which competitiveness can be
regained. First, that the countries with lower environmental standards
harmonize up to the higher standards in the importing country. Second,
that the imports of foreign products, considered to be produced in "envi-
ronmentally dirty ways," be subjected to special duties designed to offset
the "unfair cost advantage" from the less strict standards." The final
suggestion provided that the domestic industries be given subsidies to
cover the added costs of meeting the higher standards. "1 '
The author is quick to point out that under GATT, only the first
option would be acceptable. The other two options would be in conflict
with existing GATT rules. A special duty imposed on an import from a
country with less stringent environmental laws would, first of all, violate
the Most Favored Nation Principle, and secondly, could only be imposed
after an extensive re-negotiation process."' A subsidy also violates
GATT, since subsidies in general are prohibited under rules of interna-
tional trade." 3 Furthermore, the provisions of the Final Act incorporated
the findings of the Mexican Tuna panel report, which prevent one nation
from imposing its domestic laws on other contracting parties. Therefore,
domestic laws which would prohibit the importation of goods produced in
an environmentally unsound manner (i.e. Mexican Tuna case) could not
107. Id. at 34.
108. Id. at 35.
109. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
110. The Study, supra note 98, at 17. As the author of The Study points out, this is not
a GATT acceptable method.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250. Article XVI provides an excep-
tion for subsidies on agricultural and other primary products.
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be enforced against contracting parties. As a result, the contracting party
would have a competitive advantage because of the lower product price.
These GATT practices will result in more, not less, pollution because
of the improper application of the Polluter-Pays Principle. Unless all pol-
luters internalize the externalities, there will be a misallocation of re-
sources, i.e. pollution, and distortion of trade. The success of the Polluter-
Pays Principle depends on proper product pricing, and until GATT
adopts the Principle as part of its international trade policy, its claim
that trade liberalization will improve environmental quality will fail.
IV. HARMONIZING GATT AND THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE
The conflict between trade and environment has been caused in part
by conflicting goals, promoting growth versus saving the environment.
The balance between economic growth and environmental enhancement
and protection was first addressed by the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development 14 which called for "an historic transition to new
modes of environmentally sound or 'sustainable' development.""' This
concept of 'sustainable' development was defined by the Commission as
"meeting the needs and aspirations of the present and future generations
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
needs. It requires political reform, access to knowledge and resources, and
a more just and equitable distribution of wealth within and between
nations."'1 6
In 1990, the United States Environmental Protection Agency spon-
sored a workshop on sustainable development in preparation for a confer-
ence on the Action for A Common Future.' 7 The participants concluded
that all assets must be preserved for future generations, and that our
"current patterns of population and economic growth are not environ-
mentally sustainable in the long run."' 18 However, in order to achieve sus-
tainable development,
[flar-reaching changes in economic incentives are needed to ensure
that both consumers and producers face the full environmental conse-
quences of their daily choices. While information, education, and reg-
ulations are important, appropriate market signals are also necessary
to bring about widespread structural adjustment. The Polluter Pays
Principle underlies correct market signals."9
114. Strong, What Place Will the Environment Have in the Next Century - And At
What Price?, 2 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 208, 209 (1990).
115. Id. at 214.
116. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Global Change and Our Common Future, in GLOBAL
CHANGE AND OUR COMMON FUTURE 10, 12 (Ruth S. Defries & Thomas F. Malone eds., 1989).
117. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNITED STATES WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOM-
ICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: REPORT TO THE 1990 BERGEN CONFERENCE (1990) [herein-
after SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT]. This conference, which was held in Bergen, Norway, in-
volved ECE members (Eastern and Western Europe, the United States, and Canada) only.
118. Id. at 3.
119. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
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Some of the changes recommended by the participants to achieve
sustainable development include the following: 2 '
1. Revise national income accounting systems to reflect the actual cost of
conversion of natural resources.'21
2. Eliminate subsidies because they are "typically fiscally burdensome, ec-
onomically inefficient, and ecologically damaging.'
22
3. Shift the tax burden to activities that deplete natural resources and/or
cause environmental harm.
4. Focus public expenditures on preventing environmental harm.122
5. Use economic instruments 4 to facilitate rational pricing of resources
to shift the burden of paying for environmental protection to producers
and consumers, thus eliminating a subsidy.1 25
The participants recognized that these changes not only involve na-
tional but also international changes in policy. They recommended the
elimination of quantitative restrictions, tariffs, agricultural protectionism,
and other trade barriers to avoid market distortions, and the harmoniza-
tion of environmental regulations to avoid anticompetitive effects.1 26 In
other words, they recognized that, "the Polluter-Pays Principle must be
uniformly implemented in order to achieve sustainable economic and en-
vironmental development in both developed and less-developed
nations."'2 7
The Study accepts the concept of sustainable development and rec-
ognizes that its implementation depends on at least two notions, 1) assign
"values or prices to natural resources, with a view to identifying and valu-
ing the environmental effects of economic activity,' 12' and 2) to preserve
all assets for future generations.'2 9 However, the author notes that
"neither aspect of sustainable development is intrinsically linked to inter-
120. Id. at 5-9.
121. For example, the OECD found that current energy prices do not accurately reflect
production costs because the "cost" of climatic change is not included in the price. As a
result, the OECD asked that all nations expand their accounting systems to "fully reflect
environmental and natural resource conditions and trends." Once the accounting systems
reflect the proper price for all resources, a more consistent application of the Polluter-Pays
Principle will be possible. See OECD Urges "Phased Approach" in Introducing Technology
to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 14 INT'L ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 190 (Apr. 10, 1991).
122. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117, at 6.
123. This can be accomplished by creating and enforcing environmental laws.
124. These economic instruments "include fees levied on emissions and environmen-
tally damaging activities, marketable permit systems, deposit-refund systems, and non-com-
pliance charges linked to emissions standards." SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117,
at 9.
125. The "subsidy" is created by having the government or society as a whole absorb
the cost of pollution abatement and control instead of the producer and consumer. Once the
product price reflects the full cost of production, the subsidy is gone.
126. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117, at 16.
127. Kettlewell, supra note 1, at 460.
128. The Study, supra note 98, at 3.
129. Id.
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national trade. '1 3 0
The argument in The Study fails to see the link between sustainable
development and international trade. In order for producers and consum-
ers "to face the full environmental consequences of their daily choices," ''
correct market signals, i.e. proper pricing, must be in place. This can only
be accomplished through a uniform application of the Polluter-Pays Prin-
ciple.1 32 If product prices do not reflect all costs for pollution abatement
and control, then market signals will be incorrect, leading to overproduc-
tion, misallocation of resources, i.e. pollution, and distortions of trade.
Therefore, liberalized trade will only result in sustainable development,
ensuring increased economic growth without environmental degradation,
if GATT adopts the Polluter-Pays Principle. As pointed out by one au-
thor "whether liberalizing international trade is a means to support sus-
tainable development is dependent on the degree to which degradation of
the environment will be reflected in [world] prices." '
Incorporating the Polluter-Pays Principle into GATT provisions is
not a difficult task. GATT Article VI and the Dumping and Subsidy
Codes provide a mechanism for price adjustments, which could be used to
insure a more uniform application of the Polluter-Pays Principle. Article
VI and the International Dum Dumping Code of 1979"s' define dumping
as introducing a product, "into the commerce of another country at less
than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported from
one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary
course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in
the exporting country."' 36 If such dumping causes or threatens to cause a
"material injury to an established domestic industry" ' then GATT per-
mits the country to impose a countervailing duty equal to the difference
in price.1 37 The rules for arriving at that difference are very complex, 38
but the Dumping Code provides flexibility to accommodate "differences
in conditions and terms of sale, for the differences in taxation, and for the
other differences affecting price comparability."' 39
These provisions could easily be applied to environmental dumping,
i.e. failing to include pollution abatement and control costs in the product
130. Id.
131. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 117, at 4.
132. Id.
133. Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Trade and the Environmental Challenge,
25 J. WORLD TRADE 105, 109 (1991).
134. Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade, GATT, 26th Supp. BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 171
(1980) [hereinafter Dumping Code]. This Code interprets the provisions of Article VI and
provides rules for their application.
135. Id. at Part I, art. 2.
136. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI(6), 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
137. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI(3), 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
138. Dumping Code, supra note 134, at 171.
139. Id.
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price. In computing the price difference for environmental dumping, the
export price should include:
(1) the value of the environmental resources used in the production,
(2) the cost of the damage caused to the environment by production
of the product, and (3) in cases in which the exporter faces less costly
environmental requirements, the cost that would have been incurred
had the exporter been required to meet environmental requirements
prevailing in the importing country. 4 '
If the importing country imposes an anti-dumping duty equal to the
amount "saved" by the exporter, the Polluter-Pays Principle will be more
uniformly applied, leading to sustainable development.
Others have viewed lack of environmental protection as "trade-dis-
torting because it operates as a 'subsidy.' "'4' Such an environmental sub-
sidy could easily be addressed under GATT Article VI and the Subsidies
Code. 142 These GATT provisions generally prohibit government subsidies
on exported products,'14 and Article VI permits the imposition of a coun-
tervailing duty to offset the "bounty or subsidy determined to have been
granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export"
of any merchandise which causes or threatens "material injury to an es-
tablished domestic industry. ' 14 4 Therefore, the counterveiling duty as-
sessed by the importing country would compensate for any financial gains
resulting from the government subsidy. 4" This practice would offset the
failure of nations to internalize environmental costs, and would lead to a
more uniform application of the Polluter-Pays Principle and sustainable
development.
However, these tariff barriers to imports are not the only methods
140. Elize Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional Solu-
tions, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. ( ENVT'L L. INST.) 10599, 10601-02 (Oct. 1991).
141. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 48-49 (Sey-
mour J. Rubin & Thomas R. Graham, eds., 1982). As pointed out by another author, "[t]he
environmental burden that is carried by American workers and business is manifest in every
single product that we produce." Ebba Dohlman, The Trade Effects of Environmental Reg-
ulation, OECD OBSERVER 28-29 (Feb.-Mar. 1990).
142. AGREEMENT ON INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLES VI, XVI, AND XXIII
OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE OF 1979, GATT, 26th Supp. BASIC IN-
STRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 56 (1980).
143. GATT, supra note 3, art. XVI, 55 U.N.T.S. at 250. However, subsidies on agricul-
tural and other primary products are exempt.
144. GATT, supra note 3, art. VI(3), 55 U.N.T.S. at 212.
145. The United States has introduced a law titled, "International Pollution Deterrence
Act of 1991" which would impose a countervailing duty on goods produced under less strin-
gent standards. The duty will equal the amount of money saved by reduced environmental
compliance. S. 984, 102 Cong., 2d Sess. (1991). This bill is based on the assumptions that:
"1) American industry pays an enormous cost in compliance with strict environmental laws;
2) to the extent that foreign competitors operate in countries with more lax standards, they
are the beneficiaries of a 'significant and unfair subsidy'; and 3) American competitiveness
suffers as a result." See Kyle E. McSlarrow, International Trade and the Environment:
Building a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL L. INST.) 10589,
10592 (Oct. 1991).
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available under GATT to incorporate the Polluter-Pays Principle into
rules of international trade. Article XX exceptions could be expanded to
include environmental protection as a legitimate domestic goal. This
would permit the application of product and process standards to im-
ported goods, thus nullifying the effect of the Mexican Tuna panel re-
port. 46 This practice would subject domestic and foreign producers to the
same standards, a pre-requisite for the uniform application of the Pol-
luter-Pays Principle. Furthermore, this expansion of Article XX would
permit the implementation of international agreements which utilize
trade restrictions to accomplish their goals.14 7
In summary, the conflict between trade policies and environmental
protection can be reduced through the use of the Polluter-Pays Principle.
Proper product pricing will not only permit nations to reach their envi-
ronmental goals, but will also help them achieve sustainable development
without environmental harm.
V. CONCLUSION
To regard the Polluter-Pays Principle as the panacea to global pollu-
tion would be too simplistic. A uniform application of the Principle could
reduce global pollution. However, there are so many obstacles to its uni-
form application, that the Principle, at best, can have only some effect on
reducing global pollution. The degree of its effectiveness depends on the
accurate reflection of costs in the product price.
Harmonization of standards, enforcement, and liability for resulting
harm are all unresolved issues which affect the uniform application of the
Principle. GATT can play a unique role in providing a mechanism for
harmonization and enforcement of standards. One hundred eight nations
are currently negotiating the final provisions for the Uruguay Round. If
they carefully consider the role of the Polluter-Pays Principle in achiev-
ing sustainable development, and provide for its complete implementa-
tion, then trade liberalization will result in greater environmental quality
for all mankind.
146. For example, in the Mexican Tuna case, Mexican tuna producers benefitted by
harvesting tuna with less expensive methods. If such tuna is banned by the U.S. because of
more restrictive 'U.S. laws, then Mexico has to harvest its tuna using the same method as
American producers. This will provide a "level playing field" for the American producer by
equalizing production costs.
147. International agreements such as the Montreal Protocol on Substances that De-
plete the Ozone Layer and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Move-
ments of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal.
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